The war in Iran has now entered its tenth day, and it is already clear that this will not resemble the brief 12-day conflict of June 2025, when the United States and Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. At the time, President Trump declared that the strikes had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear programme. That claim now appears doubtful. One of the main justifications for the current campaign is that Iran had again moved close to uranium enrichment levels required for a nuclear weapon.
The central question now is how long this conflict will last. The answer depends almost entirely on how Washington defines victory. In many respects, it is the United States, even more than Israel, that will determine the political endgame of this war.
If the objective is full regime change and the creation of a new government capable of surviving on its own, the conflict could drag on for years. The precedents of Iraq and Afghanistan are sobering. In both cases, the United States succeeded in toppling the existing regimes, but the political systems that followed proved fragile and dependent on long-term American support. After two decades, Washington ultimately withdrew, leaving power either in the hands of former adversaries, as in Afghanistan with the Taliban, or with governments heavily influenced by factions aligned with Iran, as in Iraq.
A more limited goal would be to preserve the Iranian state while installing a leadership more favourable to Washington. That could shorten the conflict, though probably not to the extent President Trump might hope. An even narrower objective would be to leave the current regime intact but weaken it enough to limit its regional ambitions. Such an outcome might end the current hostilities more quickly, but it would also carry the risk of renewed escalation in the future.
Recent developments suggest another possible scenario. Iranian authorities have indicated that the Assembly of Experts is close to selecting a successor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Israeli officials have warned that any newly appointed leaders, as well as members of the Assembly itself, could become military targets, an implicit attempt to influence the succession process. At the same time, President Trump has hinted that the United States might seek to shape the choice of Khamenei’s successor. This suggests a strategy reminiscent of the Venezuela playbook: the regime remains formally in place, but its leadership becomes aligned with Washington.
Such an approach might appear to offer a quicker resolution to the current conflict. In practice, however, it risks triggering a prolonged war of attrition. Iran is unlikely to accept externally imposed leadership. If Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the current Supreme Leader, were selected as successor, the decision would almost certainly be interpreted as an act of defiance. Given that members of his family have reportedly been killed in recent strikes, and considering his close ties to the more hardline factions of the Revolutionary Guard, Mojtaba would be unlikely to pursue a conciliatory approach toward the United States.
Israel could attempt to target any new leadership, including Mojtaba himself, but removing successive leaders would not necessarily produce a quick strategic outcome. Instead, it could deepen Iran’s resolve and prolong the conflict.
At the same time, the economic consequences are already mounting. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, pushing oil prices higher and feeding inflation across global markets. Slower economic growth and rising energy costs could also carry domestic political consequences in the United States. If the conflict drags on, it could weaken President Trump politically and increase the risk that Republicans lose control of one or both chambers of Congress in the upcoming mid-term elections.
For Iran, this dynamic may offer a clear strategic response. By selecting a more hardline leader and absorbing the initial military pressure, Tehran could transform a rapid American-Israeli offensive into a drawn-out confrontation. In that scenario, the conflict would evolve into a long war of attrition, one that may ultimately work to the advantage of the Islamic Republic rather than its adversaries.
