“This is a good time to declare victory and get out.”
That remark is one of the few sensible statements to emerge from the US administration since the war with Iran began on February 28. One might expect such a line to come from President Donald Trump, yet it was instead delivered by the administration’s AI and crypto adviser, David Sacks, during a recent podcast interview.
By now the basic facts are widely reported. The United States severely misjudged Iran’s resilience and its capacity to withstand a prolonged bombing campaign. Washington appeared to believe that overwhelming force would quickly force Tehran into “unconditional surrender.” That outcome now looks implausible. In trading terms, the rational move would be to cut losses and exit, declaring victory before the costs escalate further. Such a narrative could still be presented to the American public. But time is not on Washington’s side.
For Israel, however, the calculus is different. While the United States seeks a resolution, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has incentives to prolong the conflict. A continued state of war increases the likelihood that he can survive politically in upcoming elections. Defeat could expose him to ongoing judicial cases. At the same time, the war provides an opportunity to advance Israel’s broader strategic aims, including consolidating control over southern Lebanon through tactics already seen in Gaza: the systematic destruction of infrastructure and the removal of any obstacles to military control. The divergence between American and Israeli objectives is therefore stark. Washington benefits from a rapid exit. Israel benefits from the war’s continuation.
The deeper problem for the United States is strategic ambiguity. Wars cannot be won without clearly defined objectives, yet Washington has offered several shifting justifications for the intervention: regime change, dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme, securing the Strait of Hormuz, and restoring regional deterrence. The proliferation of goals suggests the absence of a coherent one. As objectives shift, declaring victory becomes increasingly difficult.
For Iran, the opposite dynamic applies. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, survival itself becomes victory. Every additional day the regime withstands attacks from the world’s most powerful military coalition strengthens that narrative. Maintaining political control despite leadership losses, preserving its enriched uranium stockpile, demonstrating that the United States cannot fully protect Gulf allies, and forcing Washington to commit additional resources to reopen the Strait of Hormuz all reinforce the regime’s claim of resilience.
A US ground invasion would only strengthen that narrative further. If American troops are deployed, Tehran can claim that its strategy has succeeded in dragging the United States into a prolonged and costly conflict. Yet if Washington’s objective truly is regime change, ground forces would almost certainly be required. The same applies to permanently dismantling Iran’s nuclear capability. Air power alone cannot achieve either objective.
Instead of stepping back, however, the United States appears to be escalating. Reports indicate that Marines are being deployed to the region. What was initially framed as a rapid campaign risks becoming a long war of attrition. And here another asymmetry emerges. Iranian civilian casualties number in the thousands, but within the American narrative such losses are often described as “collateral damage,” as was also the case in Gaza. By contrast, each American soldier killed would carry enormous political weight at home, generating pressure for retaliation and further escalation. The parallels with Vietnam are difficult to ignore.
If this were merely another ill-conceived American intervention in the Middle East, it would already represent a profound contradiction. Trump entered office promising to end the region’s “forever wars” and even hinted at ambitions for a Nobel Peace Prize. Yet the trajectory increasingly resembles a return to the interventionist logic associated with George W. Bush.
The consequences, however, extend far beyond US domestic politics. The war is beginning to threaten the global economy. Tankers that departed the Gulf before the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are still making their way to Asia and Europe. Once those shipments arrive in the coming days, supply disruptions will become far more visible. If energy flows remain constrained, oil prices could move toward $200 per barrel, pushing the global economy into a severe recession.
Military resources are also finite. The United States has already begun reallocating equipment across theatres. Patriot missile systems have reportedly been redeployed from Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East to defend Gulf allies from Iranian strikes. Naval forces are also being shifted, including roughly 5,000 Marines transferred from Japan. These moves inevitably weaken other strategic fronts. Ukraine could face reduced artillery support, and security balances in East Asia may become more fragile.
The broader geopolitical implications are profound. Russia stands to benefit immediately from higher oil prices and from the diversion of Western attention away from Ukraine. At the same time, Moscow’s partnership with Tehran is likely to deepen. China has so far remained largely on the sidelines, but its position could become decisive if the conflict expands. Under such circumstances, Beijing may conclude that the question of Taiwan is no longer whether reunification will occur, but when.
The war is also strengthening the alignment between China, Russia, and Iran. Trump himself recently suggested that it is “fair” for Russia to provide intelligence to Tehran, noting that the United States offers similar assistance to Ukraine. Such statements only underline how rapidly the geopolitical landscape is shifting.
If Washington hoped to use pressure in Iran to force Beijing and Moscow into negotiations over a new global balance of power, something akin to a “Yalta 2.0,” that strategy could backfire. China and Russia may simply watch the Western alliance weaken as divisions grow between the United States and Europe, allowing them to expand their influence without making concessions.
Some analysts even speculate that, faced with deteriorating news from the Middle East, Washington might be tempted to open another theatre of conflict in search of a quick victory. One hypothetical scenario occasionally mentioned is a “friendly takeover” of Cuba.
But that is a discussion for another column.
