According to both US and Iranian sources, the two countries would be closer than ever to reaching an agreement to extend the ceasefire by 60 additional days, during which they would negotiate the terms of a more durable peace deal.

According to the news agency Axios, Tehran would pledge never to acquire a nuclear weapon and, more concretely, open its highly enriched uranium to down-blending on Iranian soil under UN inspection; yet — and this is the operative qualifier — such steps would materialise only should a second deal, governing the programme’s subsequent stage, be reached. The sequencing is deliberate: commitment first, verification later, irreversibility deferred indefinitely.

The maritime and economic provisions follow the same logic of staged reciprocity. Washington would lift its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, reopening the waterway without tolls and restoring pre-war shipping within thirty days; the ceasefire, notably, extends across the whole Middle East, Lebanon included, rather than confining itself to the immediate theatre. On sanctions, oil restrictions would be suspended for an initial sixty days, with further relief contingent upon Iranian compliance and demonstrated “good faith” in subsequent talks — relief, in other words, as a reward for behaviour rather than a precondition for it.

The frozen-asset question is where reciprocity frays. Iran wants a portion of its sanctioned funds released upon signing; Washington counters that any release would come in conditioned, sequenced tranches. The ceasefire itself runs sixty days, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, with a signing ceremony envisaged in Geneva under JD Vance and — in a nod to its brokers — christened the “Islamabad Agreement.” Thus the structure is clear; the mechanics remain hostage to the asset dispute and to whoever blinks first.

Therein lies the fragility. The MOU may have been agreed by negotiators and approved in Tehran “at high levels,” but it has not yet received approval from Mojtaba Khamenei; the foreign ministry insists no final decision has been taken, and Trump’s anticipated weekend signing has collapsed before. The frozen-asset clause stays contested.

A few things are certain. First, there have been protests in Iran against this, or any, deal. The regime’s more ideological base remains fiercely opposed to any agreement with the Great Satan. Similarly, President Trump faces opposition from radical Republican Party members — not necessarily MAGA, as Trump’s base has typically opposed a new Middle East adventure.

Secondly, in Iran and elsewhere, some fear this could be a massive trap. The story goes as follows: Trump obtains a ceasefire and — while negotiating the terms of a more durable peace deal — a US vessel, whether civilian or military, is sunk (by unspecified actors). The US would accuse Iran of sinking the ship. At that point the US could claim it had been attacked by Iran and invoke Article 5 of NATO, forcing allies to intervene in the Strait, something they have so far been reluctant to do. Additionally, Trump may use the state of war to further interfere with the midterm elections — some even fear he may ask Congress to pass a bill to postpone them. You think this is too wild? Well, just consider that the US entered World War 1 after the sinking of the RMS Lusitania; they entered WW2 after the Pearl Arbour attack; the US started the war in Vietnam after the incidents of US vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, which historians claimed never happened.

Third, anyone who expected Trump’s intervention to make things better in Iran should look at what is happening in Venezuela, where people are protesting because things have not changed since January’s arrest of Maduro. The more hopeful opponents of the Maduro regime have grown disillusioned about the possibility of seeing any change in their country; that is because Trump chose Maduro’s vice-president, Delcy Rodríguez, to run the country, not the opposition leader María Corina Machado. So, in Iran, people should expect that this deal with the US will not destabilise but rather stabilise the regime.