Last week, two episodes shaped the hostilities of the war in Iran. First was the downing of a supposedly invisible F-35 by the Iranian air-defence. Second was that Iran fired two ballistic missiles towards the Diego Garcia airbase. The US and Israeli forces understood that Iran has larger military capabilities than they initially thought. In particular, Iran reportedly possesses missiles able to reach targets 4,000 km away, rather than “just” 2,000 km. As a result, Israel has warned European countries that Iran could hit Greece, Italy, and Germany, among others.

These episodes have fundamentally changed the shape of the conflict. Initially US President Trump, as late as Friday, said he was considering the idea of “winding down” the military operations. Subsequently he issued an ultimatum (via his social platform Truth) asking the Iranians to re-open the Strait of Hormuz, saying that otherwise he will ask the US military to “hit and obliterate” Iranian power plants “starting with the biggest one first.”

Iran responded with 6 conditions to be met for them to stop the hostilities, including “assurance of no further attacks, closure of US bases in the region, compensation for Iran, an end to hostilities on regional fronts, a new legal framework for the ‘Strait of Hormuz,’ and legal action against media and personalities deemed hostile toward Iran.”

All this considered, it clearly emerges that Israel is trying to convince NATO’s European allies to join the conflict immediately, after their declaration that they may help the US keep the Strait of Hormuz open and safe only after the end of the hostilities. It is plausible that Netanyahu may have convinced Trump to issue his ultimatum (after the initial intention of winding down the operations), and potentially to move to the next phase, which is to attack the civilian energy infrastructure, followed by “boots on the ground.”

Iran cannot receive Trump’s ultimatum, and is likely preparing to resist the next phase of attacks, and to respond accordingly, by attacking the energy facilities of US allies in the region, the Arab countries. The US cannot agree with the six maximalist requests made by Iran, which includes reparations. This means that the conflict will continue. The question is: for how long?

As already discussed previously, for Israel, the conflict should last for as long as possible. For Iran, the longer the conflict lasts, the more the possibility of transforming it into a long war of attrition increases, which makes it increasingly harder for Trump to “declare victory and go home.” So, the only party interested in a quick conclusion of the conflict is the US, and this is not an enviable position. In fact, it is commonly understood that if the US puts “boots on the ground” as Trump declares that they are ready to do, this war will become quagmire worse than Iraq and Afghanistan, from which it will be very hard for the US to get out of let alone quickly and victoriously.

In fact, let’s think strategically here. At this point of the conflict, Trump cannot unilaterally declare victory and go home. The minute after such a declaration, Iran will hit any potential target in the region, to show that the war continues, and further humiliate Trump. Thus the only condition for which Trump may declare victory is a collapse of the Iranian regime, with or without a new leadership able to take over. If a new regime emerges, it would be like Afghanistan; if it doesn’t, it would be like Iraq after the US intervention.

But both of those cases also showed that, without “boots on the ground”, regime collapse/change cannot be achieved. More generally, the US military campaigns show that “boots on the ground” is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regime change – the supposedly unforgettable lesson of Vietnam that even the most flagrant military superiority, and 12 years of “boots on the ground”, does not ensure regime change and victory.

But with “boots on the ground” this conflict becomes exactly the type of prolonged war of attrition that Iran wants, so the beginning of this phase alone would represent a victory for the Iranian regime and a defeat for Trump. The US administration has asked for USD 200bn from Congress to fight this war. It is estimated that these funds would be sufficient only for the first 100 days of a ground military operation. The compounded effects of these extra costs and higher oil prices are likely to be inflationary in the short term. This is something that Trump’s MAGA base is unlikely to take lightly, and this will further weaken Trump’s position and the possibility not to be defeated in the mid-terms in November.

All of the above seems to reinforce our conviction that this war is “unwinnable” for the US administration, unless it accepts that it is likely to pay unbearable costs for a very prolonged period of time.