The four major global central banks convene in the closing days of April amid an unusually crowded constellation of shocks: a still-unresolved US-Iran conflict, persistent volatility in the Strait of Hormuz, an oil price that refuses to settle, and a Spring Meetings communiqué from Washington conceding that the global outlook has materially darkened since January. Each of the Fed, the ECB, the BoE and the BoJ will therefore meet under conditions no central banker enjoys; namely, simultaneous upside risks to inflation and downside risks to growth. The market consensus is that all four will hold; what differs is the direction in which each is leaning, and the conviction with which.

Federal Reserve (28-29 April). The FOMC enters its meeting with the federal funds target range at 3.50%-3.75%, where it has sat since the cutting cycle paused at the start of the year. Markets price near-certainty that this configuration persists. Inflation has reaccelerated, with March CPI at 3.3% year-on-year — its highest since May 2024 — fuelled by oil-driven pressures, while nonfarm payrolls added 178,000 jobs; both sides of the dual mandate are pulling the Committee in opposite directions, neither with sufficient force to compel action. The dissent picture is instructive: Miran preferred a cut in March, and both Miran and Waller dissented in January, though Waller has since warned the energy shock may prove more persistent than anticipated. This is also likely to be Powell’s last meeting as Chair, the DoJ having dropped its investigation into the Fed’s reconstruction works, paving the way for Warsh’s confirmation; the entire FOMC dynamic will shift thereafter, potentially spiced by Powell’s continued presence as Governor through 2028.

European Central Bank (29-30 April). The ECB arrives in a markedly more delicate position than the Fed, the inflationary impulse from Hormuz falling on a Eurozone economy already growing tepidly. March staff projections placed headline inflation at 2.6% in 2026, 2.0% in 2027 and 2.1% in 2028 — revised up — while growth was revised down, with GDP averaging 0.9% in 2026. What makes April unusual is the asymmetry of expectations: traders expect the key rate to reach at least 2.5% by year-end, a hike of 50 basis points or more. Lagarde has not closed the door, telling the “ECB and Its Watchers” conference that a large, not-too-persistent overshoot could warrant some measured adjustment; Nagel called Hormuz “the heel of the world economic system”; while many watchers anticipate an “insurance rate hike” to be made likely in June. The base case is a hold skewed more hawkishly than at any point since the post-pandemic tightening cycle ended.

Bank of England (30 April). Bank Rate stands at 3.75%, unanimously held in March. The wrinkle is that the MPC was actively easing as recently as December — cutting from 4.00% on a 5-4 vote — but has since paused, partly because CPI could rise to 3½% in Q3 2026 once energy effects feed through. As recently as January, April looked the most likely occasion for a cut, with a near 47% probability; oil has eroded that conviction. The base case is a hold at 3.75% with the vote tilting back towards split. Watch Taylor and Dhingra, whose framing of the shock as transitory could pre-position the MPC for a June cut should energy prices stabilise.

Bank of Japan (27-28 April). The BoJ presents a mirror image: a central bank tightening, not easing, for which the Iran shock complicates a hike rather than postpones a cut. The policy rate, at 0.75% — the highest since September 1995 — was held in March on an 8-1 vote, Takata dissenting in favour of 1%. IMF-week communication confirms the BoJ has solidified its plan to forgo a hike, deferring to June. Ueda has framed the Middle East as posing “both upside risks to prices and downside risks to the economy”. The base case is a hold with an upward revision to the FY2026 inflation projection — the dovish hold dressed in hawkish forecasts.