At the beginning of Trump’s second term in office, we published an article highlighting the many similarities between Donald Trump and Richard Nixon. To cite just one: with his sudden decision in August 1971 to suspend the dollar’s convertibility into gold, which brought down the Bretton Woods system, Nixon paved the way for a new era of finance based on free capital flows and flexible exchange rates. Similarly, Trump’s decisions to establish a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and to sign the GENIUS Act regulating USD-backed stablecoins gave a phenomenal push to the nascent digital asset industry, centred on the digital greenback. In both cases, raging wars, fast-rising public debt and the need to defend the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency were among the key motivations.
But there is another analogy that we cannot disregard. Nixon became deeply unpopular abroad, not least because of his decision to end the dollar’s convertibility into gold, accompanied by his Treasury Secretary John Connally’s notorious remark that the dollar was “our currency, but your problem”. At home he had to protest publicly that he was “not a crook”, having become embroiled in the Watergate affair: the break-in at the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters and the cover-up that followed. He became a deeply divisive and polarising figure. Watergate and the scandal of the White House tapes led the House to launch the preparatory proceedings for the impeachment of the President.
At that time, the Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress by large margins. They had held that majority since 1955 and kept it in 1972 despite Nixon’s 49-state landslide, and by August 1974 they held 248 seats in the House and 57 in the Senate. On 6 February 1974, the House passed Resolution 803 by 410 votes to 4, authorising the Judiciary Committee to consider impeachment proceedings. That near-unanimity was the first sign that the matter would not split along party lines. Between 27 and 30 July 1974, the Democratic-led committee approved three articles of impeachment. There were certainly enough votes for the articles to pass the House, but not enough for a conviction in the Senate, where a two-thirds majority of the senators present is required.
However, something remarkable happened. Once the “smoking gun” tape was released on 5 August, leaders of both parties concluded that impeachment by the full House was certain if it reached the floor, and a delegation of senior Republicans led by Barry Goldwater told Nixon that he would also lose in the Senate. On 9 August 1974, facing near-certain impeachment and conviction, Nixon became the first president ever to resign. The proceedings formally ended on 20 August 1974 without an impeachment vote. Gerald Ford pardoned him a month later, which shut off criminal prosecution and is widely thought to have contributed to Ford’s defeat in 1976.
What lesson should Trump learn from this? When a president’s party comes to regard him as a liability, as the Republicans did in 1974 with the evidence overwhelming and the midterm elections only three months away, it may join forces with the opposition and force him to resign even before the full House votes on articles of impeachment.
What is the situation now? The Democratic Party has just won a landslide in both chambers of Congress, establishing a comparable majority: more than 250 seats in the House, with NBC News projecting around 259 once counting is complete, and at least 54 in the Senate, with Alaska and Mississippi still to be called, but leaning Democrat. Trump’s conduct in office will almost certainly prompt several requests for impeachment once the new Congress convenes in January, and these would easily pass the full House, as happened twice during his first term.
The Republican Party is now split. Vice President JD Vance has already broken ranks, stating plainly that the reason for the defeat was the war in Iran, which Trump launched. If impeachment proceedings advance in the House, a “smoking gun” similar to the one that made Nixon’s position untenable is likely to emerge, and the non-MAGA wing of the Republican Party may well make explicit that it would vote with the Democrats, to improve its chances of winning the presidential race in 2028.
Has Trump learnt this lesson? His first, moderate statements immediately after the defeat seemed to suggest so. His decision to appoint the hardliner Stephen Miller as his new Chief of Staff suggests otherwise.
