



R&R Weekly Column
By Brunello Rosa



Why COVID Poses An Existential Threat to The EU

In [our column of March 16th](#), titled “The World Is Likely To Be Radically Different After The Coronavirus Crisis” we mentioned that the Coronavirus is posing an existential threat to the survival of the EU. In this column, we want to further elaborate on this issue, following [the EU Council meeting on March 26](#), in which the heads of state and governments failed to reach a deal for a common strategy to fight the crisis.

The underlying principle behind the EU integration process is the *solidarity* that member states should display towards one another on all matters of common interest, after centuries of inter-European conflict. For this reason, the first embryo of the EU was the [European Coal and Steel Community](#), coal and steel representing the key ingredients for the economic recovery in the post-War period. Once solidarity ceases to exist, there is no reason for the Union to exist either. In spite of the initial, delusional hope that COVID-19 was an asymmetric shock to Italy rather than a generalized crisis across the region, and could therefore be addressed by the activation of [article 122.2 of the EU Treaty](#) (i.e. grants to the country “seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by ... exceptional circumstances beyond its control”), it is now clear that is a symmetric shock to every country of the EU.

This means that the EU as a whole should react to it, with common instruments, rather than by simply adopting a coordinated approach of national policies by individual member states. Instead, so far national selfishness has prevailed, and countries have reacted by adopting a [series of policies based on their individual circumstances](#). For example, at the fiscal level, Germany has announced a plan of EUR 550bn of fiscal easing (of which EUR 156 will be fresh expenditures), France a EUR 300bn plan, and Italy, given its more stringent budget constraints, only a first EUR 25bn plan followed by another EUR 25bn likely to be announced in April. Virtually all countries have re-instated national borders and suspended the Schengen agreement.


At the EU level, there has thus far been only a [partial and temporary suspension of the Growth and Stability Pact \(GSP\) and an easing of the discipline regarding state aid to private-sector companies](#). Even the ECB was initially reluctant to engage in its mandatory spread-compression activities, [until finally the EUR 750bn PEPP was launched](#), with the inclusion of Greece and the suspension of the issuer limits. But this is still too little compared to what the EU could and should do to face the existential crisis before it.


With Brexit underway, and the [UK initially threatening to deviate from the continental practices](#) of social distancing to follow a chimeric and flawed herd immunity approach; with Schengen and the GSP suspended; with every country following its own approach to COVID, from para-military lockdowns ([in Italy, for example](#)) to minimal social distancing rules ([e.g. in Sweden](#)), the risk is that re-converging when the crisis is finished will become virtually impossible, as every country will find it more convenient to pursue its national strategies and interests. A country might, for example, bitterly and understandably decline to pursue European reintegration because it felt that it was neglected during the crisis.

Take Italy, for example. In 2011-12 Italy was brought to the verge of default because of the slow and flawed response (by moral hazard considerations) from the EU/EZ to the Greek crisis. Italy, which participated in the rescue packages for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, came under speculative attack because it was perceived as being part of the PIIGS grouping of economies. Only Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge and the consequent OMT avoided the disaster. In 2015, during the migrant crisis, Italy was then left alone facing the arrival of ships landing on the southern shores of Europe. In 2020, after the symmetric exogenous shock deriving from COVID, the implicit message from the EU was: “deal with it by yourself, we’ll be lenient on your fiscal position, ex-post.” It is not clear where solidarity is in all this, and we should not be surprised if, at the end of the crisis, the levels of EU-scepticism will be at historical highs. Other countries are in similar positions, and if the EU fails to rise to the historical task it is now facing, it might end up being the largest, institutional victim of Coronavirus.

So, while Merkel and [Von Der Leyen](#) declared their opposition to Eurobonds/Coronabonds being used to finance a pan-European recovery plan, the Eurogroup has been tasked with coming up with technical proposal on the feasibility of risk-sharing instruments. Hopefully, it will come up with some serious proposals in the next couple of weeks, and these approaches will be adopted by the EU Council. But other roads are possible, such as the possibility of activating [ESM loans with virtually zero interest rates and null or very limited conditionality](#). That, in turn, could open up the possibility of using the OMT to fight unwarranted widening of sovereign yield spreads within the EZ.

Our Recent Publications

 [Global Outlook Update-PART 3 – Markets – COVID-19 To Depress Valuations Until Pandemic Solution Is In Sight](#), By Alessandro Magnoli Bocchi, Brunello Rosa, Nouriel Roubini, 26 March 2020

 [GEOPOLITICAL CORNER: Revisiting the Past to Know the Present: The Spanish Flu, the Coronavirus, and the Political Risk Event of a Generation](#), by John C. Hulsman, 24 March 2020



Looking Ahead

The Week Ahead: US, Japan and EZ Macro News to Disappoint

In the US, March's PMI manufacturing will fall sharply into contraction (c: 44.3; p: 50.1) and March labor market data will weaken, as: *i*) nonfarm payrolls will likely drop to -123k (p: 273k); *ii*) the unemployment rate is expected rise to 4.0%, from its historical lows (p: 3.5%); and *iii*) average hourly earnings will likely remain unchanged at 3.0% y-o-y.

In the EZ, retail sales in February are expected to fall to 1.1% y-o-y (p: 1.7%).

In Japan, February's IP data are likely to fall deeper into contraction, to -5.5% y-o-y (p: -2.3%).

The Quarter Ahead: As Business And Consumer Confidence Tumble, World Economy Is Likely To Suffer The Worst Year Since WW2

According to **WHO's Director-General** Dr. Tedros: 1) COVID-19 is affecting 199 countries, confirmed cases surpass 660k and deaths approach 31k; 2) "the pandemic is accelerating at an exponential rate. The first 100k cases took 67 days. The second 100k took 11 days, the third just 4, and the fourth 2"; and 3) G20 leaders must "do whatever it takes" to: *i*) overcome the pandemic"; *ii*) protect lives and livelihoods; *iii*) restore confidence; and *iv*) ensure adequate financing.

In the US, President Trump signed a USD 2.2tn stimulus bill, the largest in US history, which includes: *i*) 500bn in loans for distressed companies (o/w 50bn in loans for passenger air carriers); *ii*) 350bn in small business loans; *iii*) 290bn in direct payments to individuals and families; *iv*) 250bn in unemployment insurance; *v*) 150bn for cash-strapped state and local governments; and *vi*) 130bn for hard-hit hospitals. The Fed: 1) rekindled 14 swap lines with other CBs - aiming to ease the global shortage of USD; as a result, to alleviate funding strains in local markets five CBs borrowed more than USD 200bn w-o-w, up from USD 45mn the previous week (both the ECB and the BoJ drew the most USD since 2009); and 2) announced open-ended asset purchases, with plans to buy: *i*) commercial MBSs; *ii*) bonds, directly when issued and on the secondary market; and, for the first time ever: *iii*) bond ETFs, through its New York arm.

In the EZ, finance ministers are discussing to release emergency funding via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); countries could borrow up to 2% of GDP. Former ECB President Draghi stated: "(...) you can increase your debt/GDP-ratio by increasing debt or by destroying GDP; choose the former".

Last Week's Review

Real Economy: Lockdown Measures Hit Employment And Growth; CBs Easing Intensifies

In the US, where about 1 in 3 citizens are in lockdown and most non-essential businesses have been forced to close, initial jobless claims spiked to 3.28mn in March (c: 1.0mn; p: 0.282) – the highest level since the series began in 1967, highlighting COVID-19's vast economic impact. A lagging indicator, February's 'durable goods orders' rose above-consensus, by 1.2% m-o-m (c: -0.8%; p: 0.1%), as well as 'durable goods ex. Defense' – a measure of business investment (a: 0.1%; c: -0.9%; p: 3.6%).

In the EZ, measures to contain the COVID-19 outbreak disrupted businesses and demand; March's composite PMI fell to its historical low (a: 31.4; c: 38.8; p: 51.6), as: *i*) services recorded their steepest contraction on record (a: 28.4; c: 39; p: 52.6); and *ii*) manufacturing suffered the sharpest fall in over seven years (a: 44.8; c: 39; p: 49.2).

In the UK, CPI inflation fell in February to 1.7% y-o-y (p: 1.8%), while core CPI rose to 1.7% y-o-y (c: 1.5%; p: 1.6%). The BoE kept interest rates at an all-time low of 0.1%, after delivering two emergency cuts in response to virus-induced economic and financial disruption.

In Canada, in an emergency meeting the BoC cut interest rates by 50bps, to 0.25% (p: 0.75) and started asset purchases, and Governing Council will "closely monitor economic and financial conditions, in coordination with other G7 CBs and fiscal authorities", to take further action if needed.

Financial Markets: High Volatility Despite Monetary And Fiscal Stimuli; Oil Down, Gold Up

Market drivers: Unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimuli: 1) eased a USD squeeze that was threatening the global financial system; and 2) encouraged investors and supported a rebound in stock markets, from their three-year lows.

Stocks: w-o-w, global indices fell (MSCI ACWI, -22.3%, to 447), driven by DMs (S&P 500, -23.6% to 2,541; Eurostoxx 50, -27% to 2,729) and EMs (MSCI EMs, -24.1% to 851). Volatility remains high (VIX S&P 500, -0.5 pts to 65.5; 52w avg.: 18.4; 10y avg.: 17.0).

Bonds: w-o-w, returns on indices rose (BAML Global, +1.7% to 288.3), as yields on DM 10y bonds fell for: *i*) UST (-19bps, to 0.74%); and *ii*) German bunds (-15bps, to -0.49%).

FX: w-o-w, global demand for USD weakened (DXY, -4.3% to 98.365; EUR/USD, +4.27% to 1.114), and the GBP recovered from multi-decades' lows (GBP/USD, -7.0% to 1.246).

Commodities: Oil prices continued to decline (Brent, -7.6% to 24.9 USD/b), while gold rose (Gold, +8.0% to 1,618 USD/Oz), as it keeps its safe-haven appeal.



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Abbreviations, Acronyms and Definitions

a	Actual	LN	Northern League, Italy
AKP	Justice and Development Party, Turkey	MSS	Five Star Movement, Italy
ann.	annualized	m-o-m	Month-on-month
ARS	Argentinian Peso	mb	Million barrels
avg.	Average	mb/d	Million barrels per day
bn	Billion	MENA	Middle East and North Africa
BoC	Bank of Canada	MHP	Nationalist Movement Party, Turkey
BoE	Bank of England	mn	Million
BoJ	Bank of Japan	MPC	Monetary Policy Committee
bpd	Barrels per day	NAFTA	North-American Free Trade Agreement
bps	Basis points	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
BS	Balance sheet	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
c	Consensus	Opec	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
C/A	Current account	p	Previous
CB	Central bank	P2P	Peer-to-peer
CBB	Central Bank of Bahrain	PBoC	People's Bank of China
CBK	Central Bank of Kuwait	PCE	Personal Consumption Expenditures
CBT	Central Bank of Turkey	PE	Price to earnings ratio
CDU	Christian Democratic Union, Germany	PM	Prime minister
CNY	Chinese Yuan	PMI	Purchasing managers' index
CPI	Consumer Price Index	pps	Percentage points
DJIA	Dow Jones Industrial Average Index	pw	Previous week
DJEM	Dow Jones Emerging Markets Index	QCB	Qatar Central Bank
d-o-d	Day-on-day	QAR	Qatari Riyal
DXY	US Dollar Index	QE	Quantitative easing
EC	European Commission	q-o-q	Quarter-on-quarter
ECB	European Central Bank	RE	Real estate
ECJ	European Court of Justice	RBA	Reserve Bank of Australia
EIA	US Energy Information Agency	RRR	Reserve Requirement Ratio
EM	Emerging Markets	RUB	Russian Rouble
EP	European Parliament	SWF	Sovereign Wealth Fund
EPS	Earnings per share	tn	Trillion
EU	European Union	TRY	Turkish Lira
EUR	Euro	UAE	United Arab Emirates
EZ	Eurozone	UK	United Kingdom
Fed	US Federal Reserve	US	United States
FOMC	US Federal Open Market Committee	USD	United States Dollar
FRB	US Federal Reserve Board	USD/b	USD per barrel
FX	Foreign exchange	UST	US Treasury bills/bonds
FY	Fiscal Year	VAT	Value added tax
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	VIX	Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
GBP	British pound	WTI	West Texas Intermediate
GDP	Gross domestic product	WTO	World Trade Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund	w	Week
INR	Indian Rupee	w-o-w	Week-on-week
IPO	Initial public offering	y	Year
IRR	Iranian Rial	y-o-y	Year-on-year
JPY	Japanese yen	y-t-d	Year-to-date
k	thousand	ZAR	South African Rand
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	2y; 10y	2-year; 10-year



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